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Abstract 
The characterisation of a security interest as ‘fixed’ or ‘floating’ has generated 
much  litigation  in  English  courts.  This  is  because  a  floating  charge  is 
subordinated by statute to other claims in the debtor’s insolvency, whereas a 
fixed charge is not. This paper uses the example of the floating charge to argue 
that such statutory redistribution between claimants in corporate insolvency is 
generally undesirable. If particular types of voluntary transaction are subjected 
to statutory ‘taxation’, then parties may be expected to structure their affairs so 
as  to  avoid  the  ambit  of  the  legislation.  The  paper  traces  the  history  of  the 
floating charge, showing how both its use by business, and the litigation that has 
shaped  its  juridical  ‘nature’,  have  been  driven  by  the  desire  to  avoid 
redistribution in insolvency. This has resulted in relatively little money reaching 
the intended beneficiaries of the statutory redistribution. It has also engendered  
significant costs: the direct costs of litigation and the opportunity costs of a 
constrained choice of financial structures.   
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Should We Redistribute in Insolvency? 
 
A. Introduction 
The  House  of  Lords’  recent  decision  in  Re  Spectrum  Plus
1  concerned  the 
appropriate characterization of a security over book debts as a fixed or floating 
charge. The question matters primarily because a floating charge is subordinated 
by statute to various other claims in the insolvency of the debtor, whereas a 
fixed charge is not. This paper uses the example of the floating charge to argue 
that such statutory redistribution between claimants in corporate insolvency is 
generally undesirable.  
 
Floating  charges  are  created  by  voluntary  transactions  between  lenders  and 
borrowers. If the legislature subjects particular types of voluntary transaction to 
statutory  ‘taxation’  (as  through  the  prospect  of  redistribution  in  insolvency), 
then sophisticated parties may be expected to structure their affairs differently so 
as  to  avoid  the  ambit  of  the  legislation.  In  the  case  of  insolvency,  such 
‘avoidance action’ has resulted in relatively little funds reaching the intended 
beneficiaries  of  the  statutory  redistribution.  What  is  worse,  the  law’s 
redistributive  policy  has  engendered  significant  costs.  Indeed,  the  juridical 
history of the floating charge is largely a product of litigation driven by such 
avoidance action. The Spectrum decision is only the most recent (and unlikely to 
be the final) chapter in a long series of such cases, which have, over the years, 
consumed many thousands of hours and pounds.  
 
In addition to the direct costs engendered by transaction planning and litigation, 
such statutory redistribution may also give rise to opportunity costs. These arise 
where parties choose not to use a transaction structure which would otherwise be 
useful, solely so as to avoid the statutory ‘taxation’.  This paper argues that there 
are  opportunity  costs  associated  with  the  current  scheme,  which  renders  the 
floating charge very unattractive to lenders.  
 
A floating charge over circulating assets can facilitate so-called ‘relationship’ 
lending by a concentrated creditor—that is, lending on the basis of the debtor’s 
business prospects, as opposed to collateral values. Such a lender is best able to 
make  informed  decisions  about  the  company’s  future  in  times  of  financial 
distress. Making it impossible for such a lender to take worthwhile security over 
circulating assets without exercising specific control will mean that companies 
find it cheaper to finance receivables from asset-based lenders, who are better 
placed to exercise such control. This paper argues that the statutory scheme, 
when coupled with the hardened judicial line confirmed in Spectrum, will lead 
to further fragmentation in small businesses’ borrowing. There is little reason for 
thinking that this will be a positive step.    2 
The  rest  of  this  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  B  looks  at  how 
redistribution is effected in English corporate insolvency law, and its historical 
relationship with the development of the floating charge. Section C turns to the 
impact of the scheme on corporate financing practice, and Section D argues that 
redistribution cannot be justified by reference to the benefits it brings to its 
recipients. Section E concludes. 
 
At the outset it should be made clear that this paper does not question whether 
the  House  of  Lords’  decision  in  Spectrum  is  consistent  with  existing  legal 
principle. In contrast, the point in issue is whether the statutory policy of treating 
floating  charges  differently  from  fixed,  which  is  given  teeth  through  the 
characterization rules articulated in cases such as Spectrum, is desirable (see 
Calnan, 2004). 
 
B. Redistribution and the history of the floating charge 
1. How does English corporate insolvency law redistribute? 
‘Redistribution’ is taken in this paper to mean the transfer of wealth from one 
party  to  another.  English  corporate  insolvency  law  requires  redistributive 
payments to be made out of floating charge assets in a variety different ways. 
The three most important of these may be summarised as follows. First, the 
claims  of  preferential  creditors  are  statutorily  elevated  above  those  of  other 
unsecured creditors and those of the holder of a floating charge.
2 Secondly, the 
Enterprise Act 2002 has introduced a requirement that a ‘prescribed part’ of 
assets subject to a floating charge must be set aside for payment to unsecured 
creditors.
2  Thirdly, until recently, the expenses of liquidation were also thought 
to be payable out of floating charge assets,
3 even though the procedure exists for 
the benefit of unsecured creditors alone. Although this instance of redistribution 
was recently brought to an end by the House of Lords,
4 the government intends 
to restore it shortly.
5 
 
A crucial (but frequently overlooked) point is that imposing ex post obligations 
on parties to certain sorts of transaction gives those parties powerful incentives 
to adjust their affairs ex ante so as to fall outside the scope of the ‘tax’. For these 
reasons, it is commonly thought that attempts to use the law governing voluntary 
transactions to effect distributive justice are unlikely to be successful (Kronman, 
1980; cf. Kennedy, 1982). The history of the relationship between the floating 
charge and the redistributive provisions of insolvency law provides a salutary 
example.  
   3 
2. The early history of the floating charge 
The advent of incorporation by registration in the mid-nineteenth century meant 
that shareholders, shielded by limited liability, were able to carry on business 
with  reduced  risk  consequent  on  corporate  failure.
6  Unlike  modern  listed 
companies in the UK, with share ownership dispersed amongst many investors, 
voting control in Victorian companies was almost always in the hands of the 
board of directors (Franks et al, 2005). This, coupled with the lack of reliable 
information  about  the  finances  and  prospects  of  such  businesses  meant  that 
investment in ‘outside’ equity was often a hazardous affair unless the investor 
had some pre-existing knowledge of, or geographic proximity to, the business 
opportunity in question (Baskin and Miranti, 1997: 146-151). For these reasons, 
debentures were widely considered to be a safer investment. The protection of 
debenture-holders’  interests  was  therefore  crucial  to  the  facilitation  of 
investment. 
 
Whilst  company  law—through  the  doctrines  of  ultra  vires  and  capital 
maintenance—did impose rules which can usefully be understood in terms of 
the interests of outside investors (and creditors in particular), the actual level of 
protection they  gave was strictly limited  (see Cheffins, 1997: 526-537). The 
continuing need for debenture-holder protection was met in part through the use 
of  ever-broader  security  interests  (Baskin  and  Miranti,  1997:  147-148).  An 
innovation that seems to have occurred, for limited companies incorporated by 
registration, at some point during the mid-1860s was the grant to debenture-
holders of a charge over the ‘entire undertaking’ of the company (or words to 
that effect) (Cutris, 1941; Pennington, 1960; Gregory and Walton, 2001; Nolan, 
2004). It seems likely that such charges were inspired by provisions commonly 
included in the private Acts of Parliament that were used to incorporate railway 
companies (Gregory and Walton, 2001: 137). These provisions, which had their 
source in the Companies Clauses Act 1845, permitted such companies to grant 
mortgages over their ‘undertakings’.
7 
 
There appears, at the outset, to have been considerable uncertainty as to efficacy 
of,  and  if  so,  the  appropriate  form  of  words  for,  such  ‘entire  undertaking’ 
charges  granted  by  registered  companies.  Early  examples  of  such  charges 
contained clauses expressly stipulating that the company should be free to deal 
with the charged assets until some future event—such as default on the debt 
secured, winding-up, or cessation of the business (Nolan, 2004: 120-124).
8 It 
was commonly thought that in the absence of such a clause, an implied term 
would  prevent  the  chargor  from  disposing  of  the  charged  assets  without  the 
chargee’s  consent.
9  A  clause  expressly  granting  a  power  to  deal    avoided 
immediate  paralyzation  of  the  company’s  business,  and,  at  the  same  time, 
deterred a court from concluding that the parties ‘could not have intended’ to   4 
create  a  charge  over  the  company’s  assets  at  all,  as  opposed  to  the  income 
therefrom.
10 As the courts became more familiar—and comfortable—with this 
combination, so that the existence of such a power could readily be implied from 
the grant of a security over ‘all the property’ of the company.
11 Over time, the 
term ‘floating charge’ came to be used as shorthand for a type of security which 
comprised this package of rights and powers (Nolan, 2004: 123-124).  
 
Closely related was the development of contractual receivership. Traditionally, a 
receiver was appointed on a petition to the court of Chancery to oversee the 
income  arising  from  mortgaged  property.  However,  it  became  common  for 
parties to stipulate in a debenture that the chargee should, on default by the 
chargor,  be  entitled  to  appoint  a  receiver  out  of  court,  who  would  then  be 
deemed to be the agent of the company.
12 In an important development, the 
Court of Appeal held, in Re Henry Pound,
13 that a debenture-holder was entitled 
to exercise a contractual power to appoint a receiver, notwithstanding that the 
company had already gone into winding-up. Thus the holder of a floating charge 
was assured of being able to control its enforcement, and the important legal 
preconditions for its utility had been established.
14  
 
Evidence on the commercial use of the floating charge can be obtained from 
prospectus advertisements in The Times for issues of debentures.
15 The first such 
advertisement was placed by the Royal Exchange Shipping Company Ltd on 4 
May, 1880, announcing an issue of debentures secured by a ‘floating charge on 
the  whole  of  the  ships,  undertakings,  and  effects  of  the  Company’.
16  The 
terminology must still have seemed novel amongst the investment community, 
for it provoked a letter from a reader enquiring what was meant by the term 
‘floating  charge’.  The  Times  thought  the  question  sufficiently  important  to 
solicit and publish a response from the company’s  lawyers, Messrs Ashurst, 
Morris, Crisp & Co, which explained:
17  
 
‘[S]uch a charge is now very familiar to commercial lawyers, and has 
been upheld by the Courts, including the Court of Appeal, on several 
occasions.’ 
‘The effect of it, as well settled by these decisions, is that all the property 
of  the  company,  both  present  and  future,  is  liable  for  payment  of  the 
debenture-holders …’  
 
Railway  companies,  which  as  we  have  seen  did  not  utilise  ‘true’  floating 
charges,
18  accounted  for  a  large  portion  of  the  capital  raised  by  British 
enterprises  until  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century  (Fishman,  1985:  392; 
Grossman, 2002: 129-131). This was perhaps one of the reasons why it appears 
to have taken fifteen more years for the floating charge to achieve ubiquity.   5 
With the exception of two issues advertised in 1882, no further ‘floating charge’ 
debentures were advertised in The Times until 1887, when there were six. The 
years  that  followed  saw  companies  other  than  the  railways  starting  to  raise 
capital  in  much  larger  amounts  than  before  (DeLong  and  Grossman,  1996; 
Grossman,  2002).  Much  of  this  was  debt  finance,  and  the  numbers  of 
advertisements in The Times for ‘floating charge’ debentures soared, suggesting 
these securities had become commonplace (see Figure 1, below p.7).  
 
The  position  of  debenture-holders  was  thereby  protected.  What,  though,  of 
unsecured creditors? The attitude of the nineteenth century judiciary appears at 
first to have been sanguine:  it was the unsecured creditor’s  responsibility to 
enquire whether or not security had been granted. As Malins V-C put the matter 
in  an  early  floating  charge  case,  Re  General  South  America  Co,  decided  in 
1876:
19 
‘[A] person dealing with a company knows also its powers of borrowing, 
and that the company has power to pledge every part of the property of 
the company. … Now if the creditors had been told that every particle of 
the property of this company was pledged to secure £72,000, could they 
have complained? And were they not told all this by the fact of its being a 
limited company? Were they not bound to make all these inquiries?’ 
 
3. Legislative rebalancing 
Leaving financial creditors to their own vigilance was one thing, but what of 
those  classes  of  creditor—in  particular,  employees—that  had  been  deemed 
worthy  of  preferential  status  in  liquidation,  on  the  basis  that  their  ability  to 
protect themselves ex ante was limited? The decision in Richards v Overseer of 
Kidderminster,
20 in which it was held that preferential creditors’ claims did not 
extend  to  assets  that  were  subject  to  security,  provoked  a  swift  statutory 
response (Keay and Walton, 1999). The Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy 
Amendment Act 1897 introduced, for the first time, redistribution from floating 
charge assets, by making them expressly subject to preferential debts.
21  
 
In the Parliamentary debates on the 1897 Act, there was discussion as to whether 
the priority so granted should not extend to fixed as well as floating security.
22 
There was, however, concern that subordinating fixed security would be a step 
too  far.
23  Ultimately  the  argument  that  permitted  a  distinction  to  be  drawn 
between  fixed  and  floating  security  was  based  on  a  labour  theory  of  value: 
workmen should be permitted to have a prior claim for unpaid wages against 
stock-in-trade, which would fall within the floating charge, because their labour 
had contributed to its production.
24   
   6 
Meanwhile,  in  what  was  perhaps  a  sign  of  changing  judicial  attitudes,  Lord 




‘For such a catastrophe as has occurred in this case some would blame the 
law that allows the creation of a floating charge. But a floating charge is 
too convenient a  form of security to  be lightly abolished. I have long 
thought, and I believe some of your Lordships also think, that the ordinary 
trade creditors of a trading company ought to have a preferential claim on 
the  assets  in  liquidation  in  respect  of  debts  incurred  within  a  certain 
limited time before the winding-up. But that is not the law at present. 
Everybody  knows  that  when  there  is  a  winding-up  debenture-holders 
generally step in and sweep off everything; and a great scandal it is.’ 
 
His suggestion was not taken up by the legislature of the time, although the 
debenture taken by Aaron Salomon over the assets of his own company laid bare 
the weaknesses of the contemporary notice system,
26 and seems likely to have 
formed the impetus for the introduction in the Companies Act 1900 of a public 
registration requirement for floating (and other) charges granted by a company.
27 
Moreover, a few years later, the Companies Act 1907 introduced a provision 
whereby a floating charge granted within a ‘twilight period’ shortly prior to the 
commencement  of  winding-up  proceedings,  otherwise  than  for  new  money, 
might be set aside by a liquidator.
28   
 
It is worth pausing here to reflect on the thinking that underpinned both the 1897 
Act  and  Lord  Macnaghten’s  call  for  redistribution  in  favour  of  unsecured 
creditors.  Both  appear  to  proceed  from  the  assumption  that  insolvency  is  a 
common misfortune that must be borne by the creditors. If this is the case, then 
it naturally seems unfair that one party—the debenture-holder—should be able 
to take everything. A call for a fairer balance seems quite appealing. It seems 
reasonable that workmen should have a right to be paid out of assets to which 
they have contributed value, but equally it might be tipping the balance too far 
in the opposite direction were all security to be so subject.  
 
The  problem  with  such  thinking  is  that  it  neglects  the  fact  that  subjecting 
voluntary  transactions  to  redistributive  liabilities  gives  parties  to  those 
transactions  a  powerful  incentive  to  structure  their  affairs  differently  (Baird, 
1998). Figure 1 provides some suggestive evidence. It shows (the lower line) the 
number of pages in The Times on which advertisements appeared for debentures 
secured by ‘floating charges’ during the period 1880-1910. This gives a proxy 
for the frequency for which floating charges were used. To be sure, not all issues 
of securities would be advertised in The Times. However, by also measuring the   7 
number of pages on which advertisements for ‘debentures’ appear (with floating 
charges  or  otherwise),  it  is  possible  to  give  an  indication  of  the  relative 
frequency with which floating charges were used in debt finance. This is also 
reported (divided by 10 so as to render the scales comparable) in Figure 1.  
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During the period 1887-1897, advertisements for floating charges grew relative 
to  advertisements  for  all  debentures.  This  growth  is  particularly  dramatic  in 
1897, in which year the floating charge measure reaches more than one-tenth of 
the measure for all debentures. This growth trend is then reversed, such that the 
measure  for  floating  charges  fell  off  very  quickly  relative  to  that  for  all 
debentures after 1897, then tracked the overall measure fairly closely for the 
remainder of the period until 1910. The growth until 1897 is consistent with a 
pattern of increasing uptake of the floating charge following both its established 
legal  efficacy  and  the  increasing  demand  for  finance  by  ‘non-railway’ 
companies in the 1890s. After 1897, the capitalisation of these companies did 
not  stop  growing  (DeLong  and  Grossman,  1996:  12;  Michie,  1999:  88-89; 
Grossman,  2002:  128).  This  implies  that  the  most  likely  explanation  for  the 
sudden decline in the floating charge’s relative popularity thereafter was that the 
1897 Act made it less attractive to investors who wanted a secure protection 
against risk.  
   8 
4. Secured creditors respond 
During the first half of the twentieth century, public companies’ relations with 
investors  were  transformed  by,  amongst  other  things,  improvements  in  the 
quality of information available to investors (Baskin and Miranti, 1997; Franks 
et al, 2005). As a result, it became unnecessary to offer security to persuade 
lenders to advance funds to listed companies. Secured debentures now came to 
be  seen  as  the  transaction  structure  of  choice  for  banks  lending  to  private 
companies (see Collins and Baker, 2005: 165-167), reflecting the relative lack of 
information available about such borrowers.  
 
Over the years, the range of taxes which attracted preferential status in corporate 
insolvency  was  increased  (Keay  and  Walton,  1999:  89).
29  And  in  1970,  the 
Court of Appeal held, in Re Barleycorn Enterprises,
30 that liquidation expenses 
were payable in priority to the claims of the holder of a floating charge. It seems 
likely  that  the  cumulative  effect  of  these  developments  was  to  spur  banks 
towards developing new transactional forms intended to remove the assets from 
the reach of the statutory provisions.  
 
One  example  was  the  increasing  use  of  so-called  ‘semi-automatic’  and 
‘automatic’ crystallization clauses. These provided for the crystallization of the 
floating charge either on demand by the debenture holder (semi-automatic), or 
simply  on  the  happening  of  a  specified  event  (automatic).  They  had  been 
conceived following the decision 30 years earlier in Re Griffin Hotel Co Ltd,
31 in 
which Bennett J had held that once a charge had crystallized, it ceased to be 
‘floating’  for  the  purposes  of  the  legislative  scheme.  The  idea  was  for  the 
debenture-holder to use such a clause to crystallize the charge before liquidation 
commenced,  and  thereby  avoid  being  subject  to  statutory  redistribution.  The 
efficacy of such clauses was finally recognised by the courts in the mid 1980s.
32 
However, this was a Pyrrhic victory for banks, because the legislature closed the 
loophole in 1985 by providing that a ‘floating charge’ should henceforth mean, 
‘a charge which, as created, was a floating charge’.
33 What now matters is the 
character of the charge at the time of creation, rather than at the commencement 
of liquidation.  
 
The second, and more far-reaching, innovation was that banks sought to create 
‘fixed’ charges over circulating assets. This development appeared to receive 
judicial sanction in Siebe Gorman Ltd v Barclays Bank,
34 when Slade J declared 
that a debenture creating a ‘fixed charge’ validly took effect as such over the 
chargor  company’s  book  debts.  However,  in  Re  Brightlife,
35  Hoffmann  J 
signalled a more restrictive judicial approach to the application of the statutory 
regime.  His  Lordship  considered  that  the  labels  given  by  parties  to  their 
transaction should not be determinative. Rather, whether a charge was fixed or   9 
floating should be determined by reference to the characteristics of the security 
the parties had created. Crucial, in the case of book debts, was the question of 
who had control over the proceeds of payment from debtors.
36 A requirement 
that the proceeds be paid into an account from which the chargor was permitted 
to withdraw funds in the ordinary course without the consent of the chargee 
would not suffice as ‘control’. There followed further attempts to avoid statutory 
redistribution through the drawing of an artificial distinction between debts and 
their proceeds, some of which found favour for a while with the judiciary,
37 but 
the basic approach articulated in Brightlife was subsequently affirmed by the 
Privy Council in Agnew v CIR.
38  
 
However, the position was thought by many to be different as regards charges 
over  receivables  granted  to  clearing  banks.  In  Brightlife,  Hoffmann  J  had 
carefully distinguished Siebe Gorman on the basis that the account in question 
was with the company’s bank, and contained an implied term that the  bank 
should  be  able  to  prevent  the  company  from  making  withdrawals  from  the 
account if it was overdrawn.
39 This distinction was not judicially challenged 
until Spectrum. It meant that for a clearing bank lending on an overdraft basis, it 
was possible to take security over book debts that did not become subject to 
statutory redistribution.  
 
That commercial lenders took advantage of this possibility is strongly suggested 
by empirical evidence from a new study of bank recoveries in France, Germany 
and the UK. Davydenko and Franks (2005) report, amongst other things, on the 
extent to which different classes of asset were taken by banks as collateral for 
loans during the period 1996-2003. They find that between three and four times 
as much money was lent by banks on the security of receivables than on stock in 
trade. Stock in trade is of course another of the classical categories of circulating 
asset, but one in relation to which it was not thought that a Siebe Gorman-style 
fixed charge would be feasible.  
 
In  addition  to  structuring  transactions  ex  ante  so  as  to  avoid  security  being 
characterized as a ‘floating charge’, it appears that banks also took steps ex 
post—that is, once the debtor had become financially distressed—to minimise 
the amount of redistributive exposure that they faced. Most small businesses that 
go into receivership have first spent some time in the hands of their  bank’s 
‘intensive care’ unit, which will have tried to orchestrate a rescue, if possible 
(Armour  and  Frisby,  2001:  91-95;  Finch,  2002:  211-218).  One  suggestive 
finding from Franks and Sussman’s empirical study of bank rescues was that, 
for those debtors that the intensive care unit was unable to save, banks tended to 
reduce  their  exposure  over  time,  with  the  result  that  the  companies  instead 
incurred greater amounts of trade credit (Franks and Sussman, 2005: 85-86). It   10 
seems  therefore  that  banks  have  considerable  opportunity  to  minimise  their 
floating  charge  exposure  during  this  period.  Findings  from  the  same  study 
regarding  receiverships  are  also  suggestive  of  avoidance  action  by  banks:  it 
seems to have been common for receivers to allocate a disproportionate amount 
of their expenses to floating charge assets rather than fixed charge assets. In 
effect, this meant that the expenses were paid by the preferential creditors rather 
than the bank (Franks and Sussman, 2005: 93).   
 
Through a combination of these tactics, it appears that banks were remarkably 
successful in minimising their exposure to statutory redistribution. Thus data 
from the Association of Business Recovery Professionals suggest that during the 
late 1990s, preferential creditors received full payment in less than 30 per cent 
of insolvencies, and in between 23 per cent and 40 per cent of cases, received 
nothing at all (Society of Practitioners of Insolvency, 1999: 17; Association of 
Business Recovery Professionals, 2000: 18). This impression of low recoveries 
is reinforced by data reported by Franks and Sussman (2005: 83), which suggest 
that the median recovery for preferential creditors in receiverships orchestrated 
by one of three banks studied was only 1 per cent of the debtor company’s 
assets. 
 
These findings are, in a sense, unsurprising: they reflect the more general point 
that  if  one  type  of  commercial  transaction  is  subjected  to  a  redistributive 
liability,  commercial  parties  will  take  steps  so  as  to  structure  their  affairs 
differently.  This  receives  more  general  confirmation  from  Davydenko  and 
Franks (2005), an international study of bank recoveries, which reports that both 
the  overall  amount,  and  the  types,  of  collateral  taken  by  banks  varies 
significantly  by  country,  according  to  the  extent  to  which  it  is  subject  to 
liabilities  to  preferential  creditors.  Similarly,  studies  of  venture  capital 
contracting practices in different countries suggest that national taxation may 
affect the way in which transactions are structured and indeed the level of funds 
invested (Gilson and Schizer, 2003; Armour and Cumming, 2006). 
  
5. The legislature strikes back 
The  past  few  years  have  seen  a  dramatic  series  of  legislative  and  judicial 
developments affecting floating charges. The Enterprise Act 2002, which came 
into force on 15 September 2003, made three major changes. First, it abolished 
the Crown’s preferential status, leaving only employee claims as preferential 
creditors.  Secondly,  it  introduced  a  requirement  that  a  ‘prescribed  part’  of 
floating  charge  assets,  initially  set  at  20  per  cent,
40  must  be  set  aside  for 
unsecured creditors.  This idea had a long history. It was first suggested by Lord 
Macnaghten as long ago as 1896 (above, p.6), and later formed one of the more 
controversial recommendations made by the Cork Committee (Insolvency law   11 
Review Committee, 1982). Its introduction in the Enterprise Act was intended to 
serve as a quid pro quo for the abolition of Crown preference: the government 
wanted to ensure that the recoveries given up by the Crown would go, not to the 
banks, but to unsecured creditors (Insolvency Service, 2001: 12).
41 
 
The Enterprise Act’s third change was to abolish the institution of receivership, 
long understood as being the fall-back mechanism by which a floating charge 
holder might exit from a distressed business, in favour of a new ‘streamlined’ 
administration procedure.
42 Whilst the holder of a qualifying floating charge has 
a right to appoint an administrator of his choosing out of court,
43 his enthusiasm 
to do so will be tempered by the fact that the office-holder will be under a 
statutory duty to all creditors, and that the costs of their efforts are payable out 
of floating charge assets.
44    
 
Shortly  afterwards,  in  Buchler  v  Talbot,
45  the  House  of  Lords  overruled  the 
Court of Appeal’s 1970 decision in Barleycorn Enterprises (above, p.8), holding 
that the insolvency legislation did not mandate liquidation expenses to be paid 
out of floating charge assets after all. This was a positive development from 
banks’ point of view. However, the government have indicated their intention to 
reverse this decision by legislation, so it seems likely that in due course the 
former position will be restored.
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Finally, in 2005, the House of Lords decision in Spectrum Plus has confirmed 
the correctness of the view, widely held since the Agnew decision, that Siebe 
Gorman could no longer stand.  The judicial approach to the application of the 
statute has hardened over time, in a way that may be summarised as a move 
from description to prescription. The legal connotations of the term ‘floating 
charge’  have  correspondingly  shifted  from  referring  to  a  particular  body  of 
commercial transactions to a presupposition that a single reified concept can be 
applied to all cases involving security over which the debtor has control. The 
effect is to make it much more difficult, if not impossible, for banks to take 
security  over  receivables  without  micro-managing  the  debtor  company’s 
dealings in those assets.  
 
6. How will the market respond? 
It seems unlikely that banks will respond to Spectrum by taking floating, rather 
than fixed, charges to secure receivables financing. It is of course true that the 
recent  statutory  developments  have  not  been  unequivocally  bad  for  floating 
charge holders. The abolition of Crown preference and the decision in Buchler, 
for example, have both ameliorated the debenture-holder’s position. However, 
these benefits are obscured by countervailing steps in the opposite direction. The 
Crown preference moneys are to be ‘rerouted’ to unsecured creditors.
47 And   12 
receivership,  a  procedure  that  was  undoubtedly  of  great  benefit  to  floating 
charge holders, is being replaced by the new administration procedure, which is 
funded  from  floating  charge  assets.  Moreover,  the  respite  from  liquidation 
expenses is due to end. The floating charge is therefore unlikely to become any 
more attractive to banks. Whilst they may wish to structure their lending so as to 
include a ‘lightweight’ floating charge over corporate assets, so as to be able to 
appoint an administrator,
48 banks will be unlikely to wish to lend significant 
sums against the security of a floating charge.  
 
It also seems unlikely that banks will respond by assuming day-to-day control 
over their customers’ spending so as to ensure that a charge over receivables 
would be characterized as ‘fixed’ after Spectrum. The exercise of such control 
would be likely to be uneconomic for banks, whose overdraft lending operations 
are  not  organized  on  this  basis  (see  below,  section  C.3).  Moreover,  if  such 
control requires the making of regular and repeated decisions about the wisdom 
of the debtor’s spending, then lenders may be concerned about the possibility of 
attracting liability as shadow directors.
49 
 
These  considerations  might  seem  to  imply  that  Spectrum  will  make  it  more 
difficult  to  raise  finance  against  receivables.  If  banks  will  not  wish  to  lend 
against floating charges, or to exercise day-to-day control, and can no longer 
take fixed security over receivables, will this not mean that they are less willing 
to lend against receivables at all? Posing the question in this way, however, 
omits the possibility of financing receivables by other means. From the point of 
view of a small company seeking finance, the most likely outcome would be to 
forego that proportion of its overdraft finance that it might formerly have raised 
on the security of a fixed charge over book debts, and instead to enter into an 
asset-based finance arrangement in relation to receivables.  
 
Such  an  arrangement  could  take  the  form  either  of  invoice  discounting  or 
factoring.    Invoice  discounting  involves  the  company  agreeing  to  assign 
receivables to a financier by way of outright sale, and is therefore not subject to 
statutory redistribution. The ‘price’ paid by the financier is the face value of the 
receivable,  minus  a  finance  charge.  This  is  paid  in  two  stages:  an  upfront 
payment on assignment, of some proportion of the face value of the debt, and 
the remainder when the receivable is collected. The company collects as agent 
for the financier, and pays the proceeds into a trust account, from which it may 
then draw the remainder of the ‘price’ owing. The financier will make ongoing 
decisions about withdrawals by the company from this account, which will be 
based  on  assessments  of  the  value  of  the  receivables  transferred.  Such  a 
financier, specialising in lending against receivables, may be expected to have a 
comparative advantage in performing such assessments over banks lending on   13 
an  overdraft  basis,  which  specialise  in  making  general  assessments  about 
debtors’ business prospects. Moreover, by specifically linking withdrawals to 
the ultimate value realised from the receivables which have been ‘sold’, this 
transaction avoids any real risk of constituting the financier a shadow director.   
 
Invoice discounting is functionally very similar to a loan of the amount of the 
upfront payment secured by a charge over the receivables.
50 It is therefore a 
close  substitute  for  lending  on  the  security  of  receivables  (Mian  and  Smith, 
1992: 171). As it is not subject to statutory redistribution, we might expect that, 
after Spectrum, companies would use more invoice discounting. This prediction 
receives preliminary support from data on invoice discounting for the past few 
years. Figure 2 reports the value of domestic UK invoice discounting finance 
and factoring during the period 1999-2005. It shows that invoice discounting has 
grown dramatically over the period since the Agnew decision was handed down 
by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in 2001.  
 













On the other hand, factoring has not grown at all over the same period. Factoring 
is  a  another  form  of  receivables  funding  arrangement  offered  by  specialist 
financiers. It differs from invoice discounting in that the factor, for a fee, takes 
control  over  the  company’s  credit  assessment  and  debt  collection  functions, 
whereas  under  an  invoice  discounting  arrangement,  the  company  usually 
continues  to  collect  its  receivables  as  agent  for  the  financier.
51  Invoice 
discounting  is therefore a much closer substitute  for secured lending against 
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receivables, because the debtor retains control of its sales ledger in both cases, 
neither arrangement being disclosed to customers. Whilst these are simply ‘raw’ 
data and do not control for any other variables that might be causing the trend in 
invoice discounting, they are at the very least suggestive of the prediction made 
above. The comparison with factoring, a similar form of finance that is not so 
close  a  substitute  for  secured  lending,  suggests  that  the  increase  in  invoice 
discounting  is  driven  by  substitution  from  secured  lending,  as  opposed  to 
macroeconomic  conditions.  The  implication  is  that  since  banks  first  began 
seriously to question the efficacy of the Siebe Gorman debenture, they have 
been  reducing  their  exposure  against  charges  over  receivables,  and  that 
borrowers have consequently been turning to invoice discounting instead, 
 
This effect is probably best understood as a change at the margins of corporate 
finance.  A  shift  towards  invoice  discounting  does  not  imply  that  banks  will 
entirely cease their involvement in receivables financing. Indeed, all the main 
clearing  banks  have  asset  finance  divisions  which  offer  invoice  discounting 
products. Moreover, it seems a reasonably safe prediction that some banks will 
simply seek to structure as ‘sales’ what in reality may better be characterized as 
loans against the security of receivables,
52 and that these will be challenged as 
being in substance (floating) charges. In this event, Spectrum would not be the 
final chapter in litigation concerning the floating charge. 
 
This  section  has  emphasised  the  interrelationship  between  statutory 
redistribution and the juridical evolution of the floating charge. Sophisticated 
lenders have repeatedly altered their behaviour so as to reduce their exposure to 
statutory redistribution. This has not only resulted in relatively little actually 
reaching  preferential  creditors  by  way  of  recoveries,  but  has  also  generated 
substantial  transaction  and  litigation  costs.  Our  provisional  assessment, 
therefore,  might  be  that  the  statutory  scheme  is  an  expensive,  and  not 
particularly effective, way of protecting the interests of its ‘beneficiaries’ (Keay 
and Walton, 1999: 103-105).  
 
C. The impact of redistribution on corporate finance 
In this section, we address the question whether the tendency of the statutory 
scheme to deter lenders from using floating charges entails any opportunity cost. 
That is, does it make any difference to corporate affairs whether or not a floating 
charge tends to be used to  finance  receivables? Indeed, might it be  that the 
floating  charge  is  in  some  way  pathological,  such  that  we  should  think  it 
beneficial that its use is restricted? These questions require us to consider why 
security is taken, and the particular circumstances in which we might expect a 
floating charge to be used in the absence of statutory ‘taxation’.  
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1. How is secured credit used? 
The grant of a security interest confers upon the lender two sets of entitlements, 
which relate respectively to priority of payment and to control of the collateral. 
The control rights are what economists call ‘state contingent’—in this case, their 
extent depends on whether the debtor continues to meet their obligations under 
the loan. Provided the debtor is not in default, the secured creditor’s control is of 
a purely negative variety, consisting of the ability to veto sales of the collateral. 
If the debtor is in default, then the secured creditor has a positive right (subject 
to  any  procedural  restrictions  imposed  by  insolvency  law)
53  to  control  the 
liquidation of the collateral.  
 
Granting security is therefore costly for a debtor. The creditor’s veto rights will 
restrict the debtor’s control over its business, and his priority will make it more 
difficult for the debtor to obtain finance in future. On the other hand, security is 
thought to be able to assist creditors in lowering ‘financial agency costs’; that is, 
the costs of conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976: 333-343; Triantis, 1994: 2158). For example, if the business is 
financially distressed, shareholders—or managers acting on their behalf—may 
have incentives to pursue highly risky strategies that actually have a negative net 
present  value,  simply  because  they  stand  to  benefit  from  the  upside  in  the 
unlikely  event  that  the  strategy  is  successful.  By  restricting  the  ability  of  a 
debtor to alienate collateral, security enables the creditor to prevent the debtor 
from selling assets of stable value to fund more risky business ventures (Smith 
and Warner, 1979a).  
 
Security also restricts the debtor’s ability to borrow to fund such ventures. By 
granting existing lenders priority to the firm’s assets, security forces new lenders 
to look primarily to the value generated by the ventures they fund, and thereby 
to  scrutinise  more  carefully  the  purposes  for  which  the  debtor  is  borrowing 
(Schwartz, 1989; Hart, 1995: 126-151).
54 The grant of security is thus a bond by 
the debtor not to engage in wealth-reducing transactions (Triantis, 1992). Such a 
bond is valuable to the debtor, because by ‘tying its hands’ to prevent itself 
entering such transactions ex post, it increases its borrowing capacity ex ante.
55  
 
Thus modern finance theory views security as closely related in function to loan 
covenants and contractual priority arrangements, which also impose restrictions 
on the debtor’s freedom of action that may be justified as bonds against wealth-
reducing transactions (Smith and  Warner, 1979b;  Barclay and  Smith, 1995; 
Triantis, 2000). In each case, we would expect these arrangements to be agreed 
to only where the benefits to the debtor outweigh the costs—hence riskier firms, 
which we might expect to be more prone to financial agency costs, would be 
more likely to use loan covenants and security.    16 
 
In this context, the utility of secured credit is a function of its advantages over 
and above contractual covenants (Scharwz, 1997). The key to the difference lies 
in  the  consequences  if  the  debtor  ultimately  defaults.  As  security  creates 
proprietary rights, it is ‘self-enforcing’, whereas loan covenants are not. Security 
also has another difference from loan covenants: it allocates control (subject to 
restrictions imposed by insolvency law) over the enforcement process (Scott, 
1997). This permits creditors to allocate control over enforcement to those best-
placed  to  maximise  the  value  realised,  and  to  deter  other  creditors  from 
engaging in a wasteful ‘race to collect’ when the debtor is in financial difficulty 
(Picker, 1992). We would therefore expect security to be used by those firms 
which are riskiest, or about which creditors have least information. Risky firms 
are  more  likely  to  default,  and  hence  more  likely  to  go  into  insolvency 
proceedings. In keeping with these predictions, empirical studies from both the 
UK and other jurisdictions establish that security tends to be used principally in 
relation to smaller, younger, and riskier firms (Berger and Udell, 1990; Chen et 
al, 1998; Lasfer, 2000).  
 
The ability of corporate debtors to grant security has the potential to yield social 
benefits extending beyond the parties to the security agreement (that is, ‘positive 
externalities’)  (Triantis,  1992;  Schwarcz,  1997;  Mokal,  2002).  Ex  ante,  by 
facilitating bonding and monitoring activity, security lowers the probability that 
the debtor will engage in wealth-reducing transactions, and helps to reduce the 
probability of default. This increases the value of all creditors’ claims. Ex post, 
by facilitating efficient enforcement, it can increase the overall ‘size of the pie’ 
for  distribution.  As  we  shall  see,  the  way  in  which  these  benefits  may  be 
generated depends in part upon the identity and lending strategy of the creditor 
and the scope of the collateral. In the discussion that follows, attention will be 
restricted to the context of small and medium-sized firms, since, as we have 
seen, these are the principal users of secured credit.  
    
Asset-based  lending:  ‘focal’  monitoring  and/or  enforcement.  Consider  first  a 
security interest in a single asset, or a particular class of assets. This would be a 
natural  complement  for  a  creditor  following  an  asset-based  lending  strategy. 
Such  a  lender  relies  not  upon  its  predictions  about  the  debtor  firm’s 
creditworthiness, but on the ability of specific asset classes to cover repayment 
(Berger and Udell, 2005). In the modern business lending environment, such 
‘asset-based  finance’  encompasses  hire  purchase  or  leasing  agreements  and 
factoring  arrangements,  which  together  account  for  a  share  of  the  external 
finance sought by UK SMEs second only to banks (Cosh and Hughes, 2003: 80; 
Fraser, 2004: 61). It also includes trade credit granted on title retention terms. In 
practice  each  of  these  tends  to  utilise  transactional  structures  that,  strictly   17 
speaking,  involve  the  financier  having  outright  ownership  of  the  asset,  as 
opposed merely to a security interest (Bridge, 1992). In function, however, these 
are equivalent to security.
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Consider the effect of granting a security interest over a single asset or class of 
asset  to  a  financier  who  has  specialist  knowledge  about  the  asset  class  in 
question, and/or the market(s) in which it is sold. The lender’s expertise would 
enable her to exercise her control rights effectively, and thereby facilitate the 
monitoring of the debtor’s use of the collateral and—should default occur—
enforcement  against  it.  Moreover,  the  priority  associated  with  the  security 
interest can sharpen the lender’s incentive to do so. As the lender’s priority will 
be limited to the proceeds of sale of these assets, this will focus her attention on 
the  fate  of  that  asset,  as  opposed  to  that  of  the  debtor  company’s  business 
generally  (Levmore,  1982;  Longhofer  and  Santos,  2003).  Thus  a  security 
interest in a particular asset is most usefully granted to a creditor with specialist 
knowledge regarding the asset class in question. It not only allocates control 
rights  to  the  party  best  placed  to  exercise  them,  but  also  gives  the  lender  a 
powerful incentive to care about how they are exercised.  
 
The use of title retention clauses in conjunction with a grant of trade credit 
provides an intuitive example.
57 A trade creditor who supplies a particular type 
of input, being in the business of selling that product, is probably best-placed 
amongst the debtor’s creditors to liquidate unused quantities of that input on the 
debtor’s insolvency. On this view, the original supplier’s comparative advantage 
makes  it  efficient  for  them  to  control  enforcement  against  goods  they  have 
supplied, provided that in removing these inputs they do not destroy operating 
synergies  with  other  assets  belonging  to  the  debtor.
58  It  also  provides  a 
justification for the judicial limitation of such a creditor’s priority to the original 
goods: there is no reason to suppose that the title retention creditor would have 
any comparative advantage in realising these.
59 
 
Relationship  lending:  general  monitoring  and/or  enforcement.  In  contrast  to 
asset financiers, the approach generally adopted by banks—which provide the 
majority of the external finance to SMEs in the UK (Cosh and Hughes, 2003: 
80; Fraser, 2004: 61)—is to advance funds on the basis of the debtor’s general 
business prospects. A bank’s credit decision could either be made using publicly 
available  financial  information,  or  could  involve  the  creditor  developing  a 
relationship with the debtor where ‘soft’ information may be gathered on an 
ongoing  basis  to  assist  in  making  decisions  about  further  advances  in  the 
future—so called ‘relationship’ lending (Berger and Udell, 2005).  
   18 
A lender advancing credit on business-based criteria may be expected to invest 
in specialist knowledge about business generally, or—in the case of relationship 
lending—the debtor’s business in particular. Granting a general security interest 
to such a lender can assist in controlling financial agency costs (Scott, 1986; 
Armour and Frisby, 2001: 79-86). Where the debtor is relatively high-risk—as is 
the case with small businesses—then a relatively tight control is called for (see 
Carey  et  al,  1998).  Giving  veto  rights  to  a  range  of  creditors  will  lead  to 
coordination  costs  in  their  decision-making.  In  contrast,  concentrating  the 
decision  rights  in  the  hands  of  a  single,  well-informed,  creditor  (which  for 
simplicity we will call a ‘bank’) may be the most efficient way of managing the 
problem (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Financial economists speak of the bank 
acting as a ‘delegated’ monitor on behalf of the other creditors (eg Diamond, 
1984).  
 
It  might  be  thought  that  the  priority  associated  with  such  a  general  security 
would weaken the bank’s incentive to invest in gathering information about, and 
monitoring,  the  debtor’s  business  (Jackson  and  Kronman,  1979:  1143-1161; 
Fama, 1990: S84; Finch, 2002: 258). The intuition is that if the bank is a senior 
claimant, it will not be sufficiently concerned with monitoring the debtor.. This 
intuition is based on two assumptions: (i) that more creditor control is always 
better than less; and (ii) that a junior creditor always has the strongest incentives 
to monitor. However, neither turns out to be reliable.  
 
Creditor control has significant costs as well as benefits. These costs are the 
inverse of the costs of shareholder control. Just as the shareholders have an 
incentive to prefer excess risk, creditors have an incentive to prefer too little risk 
(Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976).  And  just  as  shareholder’s  incentives  are 
misaligned from maximising the firm’s value when it is financially distressed, 
creditors’ incentives are misaligned from value maximisation when it is solvent. 
It follows that the more financially distressed the debtor’s position, the greater 
will be the benefits of creditor control, and the lower the costs. Thus it makes 
sense  to  give  a  concentrated  creditor  an  incentive  to  intervene  which  will 
become progressively greater with the severity of the firm’s financial distress. 
 
However, a junior creditor’s incentive (and ability) to exert control does not 
increase in linear fashion with the financial difficulties of the firm as a whole. 
Rather, a junior creditor’s incentive to intervene begins early, when its claim is 
‘close to the money’. This may result in too much creditor ‘discipline’ for the 
firm (Diamond, 1993). Moreover, if the firm’s financial position deteriorates 
seriously, a junior creditor will find its incentive and ability to intervene will 
decline, at the very point when it is potentially most valuable. Its incentive will 
be dulled by the  fact that the marginal benefit of its efforts will now go  to   19 
creditors ranked above it (Park, 2000; Longhofer and Santos, 2000). Its ability to 
influence the debtor by threatening insolvency proceedings will weaken. The 
threat  will  cease  to  be  credible  as  the  creditor’s  likelihood  of  repayment  in 
insolvency  diminishes  (Park,  2000;  Elsas  and  Krahnen,  2002).  Thus  making 
bank debt senior gives the concentrated creditor an incentive to intervene when 
it matters most, and the ability to exert meaningful control.  
 
That banks, with senior priority status, do in fact exercise this control when the 
debtor is financially distressed, in a way that is beneficial for other creditors, is 
apparent  from  empirical  studies  of  banks’  orchestration  of  informal  rescues 
(Armour  and  Frisby,  2001;  Baker  and  Collins,  2003;  Franks  and  Sussman, 
2005). Franks and Sussman (2005: 76-77) found that the average firm in their 
sample of financially distressed borrowers spent seven and a half months with 
banks’ Business Support Units (‘BSU’s,  or colloquially, ‘intensive care’), and 
that (depending on the bank) about somewhere between half to three quarters of 
these  firms  emerged  from  the  BSU  without  going  into  formal  insolvency 
proceedings. 
 
It  is  also  worth  reflecting  on  the  consequences  of  the  implicit  alternative  to 
giving seniority to a concentrated lender such as a bank. Making the bank junior 
would mean that a variety of other creditors, each with smaller claims, would be 
senior to it. If they were called upon to effect an informal rescue, it would be 
relatively costly for them to co-ordinate. They are more likely to seek to enforce, 
in  order  to  protect  their  positions  (Webb,  1991:  143-146).  At  best,  this  will 
frustrate  informal  rescues;  at  worst,  it  will  bring  about  the  break-up  of  the 
debtor. Franks and Sussman emphasise the passivity of junior creditors with 
small claims during the orchestration of an informal rescue by a concentrated 
senior  creditor.  This  is  because,  being  junior,  they  stand  to  gain  nothing  by 
seeking to enforce against the firm’s assets (Franks and Sussman, 2005: 88-91).   
 
2. Is secured credit harmful? 
It is argued by some that a social loss may result from the use of secured credit 
in the presence of ‘non-adjusting’ creditors: that is, creditors whose decision to 
extend credit does not fully reflect the increased risk (to them) associated with 
the  fact  that  the  debtor  has  granted  security  (Scott,  1977;  LoPucki,  1994; 
Bebchuk abnd Fried, 1996; Finch, 1999). The intuition is that, all other things 
being equal, a loan made on a secured rather than an unsecured basis will carry 
with it a lower rate of interest, reflecting the reduction in risk that the lender will 
bear.  Moreover,  all  other  things  again  being  equal,  an  unsecured  creditor  is 
worse off if his debtor has granted security to another creditor.  Thus unless 
unsecured creditors ‘adjust’ to reflect the increased risk it brings for them, a 
grant  of  security  may  result  in  a  transfer  of  wealth—in  an  expected-value   20 
sense—from unsecured  debtors to  the borrower. By borrowing  on a secured 
basis, the debtor obtains a lower interest rate; by failing to adjust, the ‘cost’ is 
borne by unsecured creditors. 
 
This claim does not necessarily imply that the benefits of security discussed in 
the previous section do not exist. Yet at the very least it implies that, even if 
such benefits exist, the possibility of such wealth transfers will lead debtors to 
take ‘too much’ security (Bebchuk and Fried, 1996). The costs of granting such 
‘unnecessary’ security will be wasted. Moreover, non-adjusting creditors who 
thereby end up bearing the additional risk may be poorly diversified and so least 
well-placed to bear it (Finch, 1999). Whilst the current state of the empirical 
evidence does not permit us to answer the question unequivocally, it does seem 
more likely than not that the benefits associated with security outweigh its costs.   
 
As we have seen, security tends to be granted by firms which are at relatively 
greater  risk  of  default.  This  seems  consistent  with  the  predictions  of  both 
theories that explain security by reference to its function in reducing agency 
costs and by reference to its potential for transferring wealth from non-adjusting 
creditors. The benefits of policing a debtor so as to reduce their likelihood of 
default will clearly increase with the debtor’s riskiness. At the same time, the 
expected value of the ‘insolvency share’ of unsecured creditors, which the critics 
of security argue it permits to be ‘sold’ to secured creditors, also increases with 
the probability of the debtor’s default. The pattern of security, in and of itself, 
could be explained by reference to either, or a combination of both, effects. 
 
It has been suggested by some that the ‘wealth transfer’ theory may be rejected 
on the basis that a grant of security does not appear to result in any reduction in 
interest rates for borrowers. Thus, it is argued, debtors cannot stand to benefit 
from ‘selling’ the insolvency share of unsecured creditors to secured creditors 
(Mokal,  2002:  713).  For  example,  Davydenko  and  Franks  (2005)  find  no 
statistically  significant  relationship  between  loan  interest  margins  and  the 
presence of security; a finding which is robust for results relating to the UK, 
France and Germany. However, this might simply be because the authors have 
not controlled completely for the fact that security tends to be most valuable to 
lenders in relation to higher risk borrowers, and that therefore a firm borrowing 
on a secured basis tends in any event to be charged a higher interest rate (see 
Booth and Booth, 1996).  
 
Another objection to the claim that security is harmful is that it seems unlikely 
that there are significant numbers of ‘non-adjusting’ creditors. Those claiming 
that security is used to transfer wealth typically assume that trade creditors’ 
adjustment is only partial, on the basis that they face relatively high information   21 
and transaction costs relative to the amount at stake.
60 Yet we have seen that 
security tends to be ubiquitous amongst  smaller, younger  firms. It would be 
surprising  if  trade  creditors  could  not  use  these  borrower  characteristics  as 
readily  observable  proxies  for  whether  or  not  security  had  been  granted. 
Moreover, the assumption it is not consistent with the empirical data. Whilst 
trade  creditors  do  tend  to  offer  the  same  terms  to  all  ‘borrowers’  (that  is, 
customers who purchase on credit) (Ng et al, 1999), the non-adjustment idea is 
contradicted by evidence that trade creditors tend to adjust the amount of trade 
credit granted in accordance with the debtor’s creditworthiness and the scope for 
misbehaviour by the debtor (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Burkart et al, 2004). 
Thus it seems likely that the beneficial aspects of security are empirically more 
significant than the potentially harmful aspects. 
 
3. The floating charge and security over receivables 
The case for special treatment of floating charges turns on two points. First, it is 
argued that floating charges are likely to be of limited use in controlling debtor 
misbehaviour,  and  therefore  give  rise  to  less  benefits  than  other  forms  of 
security (Mokal, 2003).
61 The debtor’s ability to deal with the collateral in the 
ordinary course of business (‘OCB’) weakens the creditor’s ability to control 
asset substitution. Moreover, the fact that a floating charge is subordinated to 
subsequent fixed charges clearly restricts its usefulness as a means of ‘locking 
in’ priorities.
62 Secondly, it is thought that the way in which the floating charge 
is typically general in its scope, and extends to after-acquired property, renders it 
particularly likely to be redistributive in effect. This may permit the holder of a 
floating charge to ‘poach’ the insolvency value of assets that the company has 
acquired with finance provided by subsequent lenders. To be sure, provided they 
are notified of the existence of the charge, subsequent lenders are able to protect 
themselves by adjusting the terms of their contracts, but clearly not all of them 
do so. Thus emerges the case against the floating charge: on this analysis, it 
appears to be more likely to be a mechanism for harming unsecured creditors 
than anything else.   
 
However,  both  of  these  features  need  to  be  placed  in  context.  The  floating 
charge was, as we have seen, originally developed as a means of taking security 
over circulating assets. The way such assets are used in business is such that the 
costs of the control rights associated with a fixed security (in terms of impeding 
useful  business  activity)  would,  for  many  lenders,  outweigh  the  benefits  (in 
terms of avoiding harmful actions). As we shall see, the costs of exercising such 
control rights would only be manageable for a lender following an asset-based 
lending strategy, who has invested in specialist knowledge of this asset class. 
For a relationship lender, the floating charge may therefore be a useful form of 
security.    22 
 
Asset-based lending: circulating assets. Consider first a financier specialising in 
circulating  assets—such  as  receivables  (see  Mian  and  Smith,  1992).  Such  a 
financier—an  invoice  discounter,  for  example—will  take  either  a  security 
interest over, or ownership of, specified receivables, in return for which they 
will  advance  funds  to  the  borrower  company.  The  better  the  quality  of  the 
receivables, the greater the proportion of their face value which the financier 
will  be  willing  to  advance.
63  The  financier  will  therefore  need  to  engage  in 
monitoring the quality of receivables, and will likely bring specialist knowledge 
to  bear  in  making  this  assessment.
64  He  will  also  wish  to  control  what  the 
borrower  does  with  the  proceeds  of  payment  from  receivable  debtors—for 
example requiring the proceeds to be paid into a trust account, from which it 
would only be permitted to withdraw funds in excess of the amount advanced in 
respect  of  outstanding  receivables.  Because  of  the  way  such  a  financier  is 
making  continuous  assessments  of  its  exposure  based  on  the  quality  of  the 
receivables, and requiring payments into a trust account to control its exposure, 
such a financing arrangement could practicably be structured either on the basis 
of sale of the receivables, or through a fixed charge.  
 
Relationship  lending:  circulating  assets.  Consider  now  the  case  of  a  lender 
advancing funds on the basis of the debtor’s business prospects. As has been 
discussed,  a  relationship  lender  would  wish,  in  order  to  maximise  their 
influence, to take security over as much of the debtor’s assets as possible. In 
relation  to  circulating  assets,  however,  and  lacking  specialist  knowledge,  it 
would not be economic for such a lender to take fixed security, because of the 
need for frequent turnover of the assets.  
 
Yet  if  the  lender  instead  takes  floating  security,  this  does  not  imply  it  is 
powerless to prevent the debtor from acting contrary to its interests (cf Mokal, 
2003). Recall that the nature of the monitoring performed by such a lender is 
different to an asset-based lender: a relationship lender’s expertise lies in its 
ability to assess the debtor’s business. What is useful is a veto over decisions 
that will change the debtor’s line of business. Thus the usefulness of a floating 
security over receivables to such a lender lies not in the details of specific book 
debts, but in the lender’s ability to control their use (along with all the debtor’s 
other assets) in extraordinary circumstances.
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Such a lender would of course structure their debenture security as fixed charges 
over specific assets coupled with a residual floating charge.
66 Yet, because the 
debtor will not typically be alienating its fixed assets in the ordinary course of 
business,  the  circumstances  under  which  the  lender  will  be  called  upon  to 
exercise  its  veto  rights  will  actually  be  similar  in  relation  to  each  type  of   23 
collateral—that  is,  transactions  outside  the  ordinary  course  of  business.  In 
addition, when coupled with the power to deny the debtor the ability to continue 
to  use  the  circulating  assets,  this  could  act  as  a  powerful  threat  to  deter 
misbehaviour generally. Moreover, a floating charge will lock in the lender’s 




Moreover, such a security is no more likely to be harmful to unsecured creditors 
than any other. The apparent generality of its scope is illusory—it will in reality 
only cover circulating assets, because fixed charges will be taken over the rest. 
To be sure, it captures after-acquired property, but this is only in return for other 
assets being permitted to leave the security. It is because of this that unsecured 
creditors can get paid by the debtor in the ordinary course of business without 
infringing the security. 
 
Thus a floating charge would be most likely to be used by a relationship lender 
as  part  of  a  package  of  general  security.  However,  the  statutory  ‘taxation’ 
imposed  on  floating  charges  means  that  they  are  rendered  less  attractive  to 
lenders.  After  Spectrum,  no  longer  able  to  avoid  this  by  characterising  their 
security as ‘fixed’, banks will find it difficult to couple a relationship lending 
approach with effective security over book debts. The likely effect, as suggested 
by Figure 2, will not be for small businesses to start borrowing on an unsecured 
basis from their banks. Rather, they are likely to find it cheaper to substitute 




4. Asset-based vs relationship lending?  
Sections  C.1  and  C.2  have  argued,  respectively,  that  security  is  capable  of 
leading to benefits in relation to both asset-based and relationship lending, and 
that these benefits outweigh the costs of the institution. However, section C.3 
implies that statutory redistribution from the floating charge, coupled with the 
decision  in  Spectrum,  will  engender  a  shift  towards  asset-based  finance  in 
relation to receivables.  
 
The most significant difference between these two types of strategy concerns 
decisions  regarding  a  debtor  in  financial  distress.  Asset-based  lenders  are 
numerous, and they focus on specific collateral. Thus they have comparative 
advantage at liquidating that collateral, but have difficulty in co-ordinating to 
make decisions about the business as a whole. Relationship lenders, on the other 
hand, have comparative advantage in organising rescue operations and making 
difficult decisions concerning the fate of a troubled firm as a whole.  
   24 
A  typical  small  firm  might  use  a  mixture  of  relationship  and  asset-based 
finance.
69  All  other  things  being  equal,  we  would  expect  to  see  asset-based 
finance  being  used  in  relation  to  assets  that  are  not  complementary  to  the 
business as a whole: that is, they could be repossessed by the financier without 
inflicting harm on the business. In a period of financial distress, however, it 
would be the relationship lender to which the debtor would turn for extra funds. 
Once  asset-based  lenders  become  aware  that  the  debtor  is  having  financial 
difficulties, then their collective behaviour may be hard to control (Armour and 
Frisby, 2001: 79-86; Franks and Sussman, 2005: 88-91). There is a likelihood 
that  at  least  one  or  two  might  seek  to  liquidate  their  collateral.  This  may 
precipitate  corporate  insolvency  proceedings.  To  be  sure,  administration 
proceedings would impose a moratorium on such actions, but the very fact of 
having entered formal insolvency proceedings will be extremely destructive to 
the  debtor’s  goodwill  and  greatly  reduce  its  chances  of  being  successfully 
rescued  (Meeks  and  Meeks,  2004).  Thus  the  debtor  will  be  likely  to  seek 
additional finance from a relationship lender, which can be used to pay debts 
falling due to asset-based financiers in the interim. That way, distress does not 
become public knowledge. 
 
The foregoing has three salient implications for our enquiry. First, pushing small 
firms towards asset-based finance in relation to receivables is likely to increase 
the level of payments that a bank funding a ‘workout’ must cover, in order to 
ensure  that  the  company  maintains  current  payments  to  all  its  creditors. 
Secondly, the reduction in a firm’s exposure to its bank which this shift implies 
is likely to make the bank less willing to invest in the first place in gathering 
information about the debtor’s business and prospects. Thirdly, receivables are 
likely to be highly complementary to a firm’s business, and so the introduction 
of an asset-based lender may make rescue operations rather more difficult for 
this reason. The implication is that increasing fragmentation and a shift towards 
asset-based lending may make it more difficult for workouts to succeed.
70  
     
D. The impact of redistribution on recipients 
We have seen that statutory redistribution from the floating charge has yielded 
direct costs in terms of avoidance action, and may distort borrowing patterns in a 
way  that  will  generate  further  costs.  However,  in  order  to  complete  our 
assessment of redistribution in insolvency, we need now to consider the case for 
making  payments  to  the  various  beneficiaries.  If  there  are  sufficiently  large 
benefits for these groups, this may lead us to conclude that the costs of the 
scheme are worth bearing. Alternatively, if the benefits are not sufficiently large, 
but nevertheless positive, we may wish to consider ways of effecting payments 
to these groups which involve less distortion of lending practice.  
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1. Employees 
Perhaps the strongest prima facie claim may be made in relation to employees. 
Statutory priority for employee claims forces the company (and through it, the 
other creditors) to insure them to a certain extent against the risk of failure. This 
may  generate  benefits  where  employees  are  risk-averse  (Jackson  and  Scott, 
1989),  and  particularly  where  they  are  asked  to  make  investments  in  firm-
specific human capital (which will be a risky investment) (Armour and Deakin, 
2003: 444-446).  The argument is that employees may be unwilling to make 
risky investments of this sort unless they are insured against the possibility of 
firm failure. Their elevation in insolvency increases their chance of repayment 
should the firm fail, thereby lowering the risk involved in such an investment. 
 
A  moment’s  reflection  shows  that  the  extent  to  which  these  theoretically-
plausible benefits are captured by the statutory regime is negligible. Employees 
obtain  priority  for  unpaid  wage  claims  only  up  to  a  maximum  of  £800  per 
person.
71 This sum, which has not been increased since 1976 (Keay and Walton, 
1999:  91),  cannot  sensibly  be  claimed  to  operate  as  any  sort  of  insurance. 
However, employees also have entitlements under the Employment Rights Act 
1996 to payments out of the National Insurance Fund in respect of unpaid wages 
where their employer has entered insolvency proceedings.
72 More than twice as 
much may be claimed under this Act, and the payments are usually made far 
more  quickly  than  by  a  liquidator.
73  The  National  Insurance  Fund  is  then 
subrogated  to  employees’  preferential  claims  in  their  employers’  insolvency 
where they have been paid under the 1996 Act.
74  
 
The existence (and effectiveness) of the employees’ claims against the National 
Insurance Fund shows that, in order for  employees to receive the insurance-
related benefits which are claimed to be provided by their preferential status, it 
is not necessary to engage in redistribution between the claimants in insolvency. 
Rather, employees can (and, in fact, largely do) get the same benefits by means 
of direct payments from the state. Moreover, by a scheme structured in that 
fashion, the need for distorting effects on lending patterns would be avoided. If 
the benefits to employees of such insurance are real, then a case may be made 
for increasing the level of payments made by the state. 
 
2. The Crown 
The inclusion of Crown claims for tax amongst those preferentially entitled was 
said to be  justified on the basis that the Crown  is an ‘involuntary’ creditor, 
which  cannot  adjust  the  terms  on  which  ‘credit’  for  unpaid  tax  is  extended 
(Insolvency Law Review Committee, 1982). This, however, is not really true, as 
the Crown has control over the resources dedicated to the enforcement of unpaid   26 
taxes,  and  can  thereby  very  much  affect  the  ‘terms’  debtors  can  expect  to 
experience.  Moreover,  it  seems  that  Crown  preference  created  unanticipated 
costs in corporate rescue proceedings. The Inland Revenue was reported to take 
an  unduly  negative  approach  to  reorganization  proposals  (milman  and 
Chittenden, 1995). The Revenue would stand in most cases to be paid in full in 
liquidation, ahead of the holder of a floating charge, whereas in a CVA they 
would  need  to  wait  before  receiving  payment.  They  therefore  lacked  any 
incentive  to  agree.  Bearing  these  points  in  mind,  the  abolition  of  Crown 
preference by the Enterprise Act 2002 seems clearly to be welcomed.  
 
3. Liquidation expenses 
It is commonly thought to be necessary to pay liquidation expenses ahead of 
unsecured  creditors’  claims  in  order  to  induce  liquidators  to  undertake  their 
work. Yet it is also desirable to ensure that they are not given incentives to incur 
more expenditure than is justified the value of the assets at stake. If liquidation 
expenses  take  precedence  only  over  unsecured  claims,  then  the  unsecured 
creditors  have  both  the  incentive  and  the  ability  to  control  the  liquidator’s 
expenses. They appoint (and remove) the liquidator, and it is their money at 
stake. 
 
Yet if liquidation expenses take priority over the claims of secured creditors, this 
creates an incentive for more to be spent than is justified by reference to the 
recoveries flowing to the unsecured creditors. The unsecured creditors will not 
be with expenses paid from funds which would not otherwise be available to 
them.  Permitting  liquidation  expenses  to  be  paid  for  out  of  secured  assets 
therefore tends to encourage excessive expenditure (Bris et al, 2004; Schwartz, 
2005: 1235-1238). 
 
A  particularly  egregious  form  of  overspending  arises  from  attempts  by  the 
liquidator  to  increase  the  value  available  to  the  unsecured  creditors,  by 
challenging the validity of security. Paying liquidation expenses out of floating 
charge  assets  actually  permits  the  liquidator  to  use  the  chargee’s  funds  to 
challenge his own security.
75 Following a change to the Insolvency Rules in 
December  2002,  the  costs  of  such  litigation  brought  by  a  liquidator  would 
clearly be classified as ‘expenses of the liquidation’.
76 A chargee faced with 
such a challenge would of course respond by spending money on defending their 
status. On neither side would the expenditure increase the size of the asset pool 
available for the creditors as a whole; in contrast, it would simply deplete the 
creditors’ total recoveries.  
 
It might be argued that a social benefit is derived from requiring liquidation 
expenses to be paid out of floating charge assets (Mokal, 2004). Liquidators   27 
frequently investigate fraudulent conduct by company directors, and if floating 
charge assets are not available to them, they may not be able to do so. Such a 
concern  certainly  appears  to  have  motivated  the  Court  of  Appeal  in  Re 
Barleycorn Enterprises.
77 However, this investigatory function is imposed on all 
office-holders—including  administrators,  who  act  for  both  debenture-holders 
and unsecured creditors (Armour and Walters, 2006). It is not clear why, in 
liquidation, it should be imposed on a party who does not stand to benefit from 
the proceedings. More generally, such a benefit would equally well be obtained 
if the cost of such ‘public’ aspects of insolvency proceedings were funded by the 
state.  
   
4. Unsecured creditors generally 
Some of those who emphasise the potentially harmful or inefficient aspects of 
security  argue  that  a  ‘carve  out’  from  secured  credit—that  is,  a  certain 
proportion  of  secured  creditors’  recoveries  should  be  set  aside  for  general 
unsecured  creditors—would  ameliorate  these  problems  (Bebchuk  and  Fried, 
1996: 904-912; Finch, 1999: 664-665). On first blush, the ‘prescribed part’ of 
floating  charge  assets  set  aside  for  unsecured  creditors  might  look  like  the 
implementation of such a policy. However, if that is its purpose, it is likely to be 
inefficacious, even if we assume  for  the moment that security is harmful to 
unsecured creditors. This is because, as we have seen, the impact of statutory 
redistribution under English law is not to encourage debtors to take less security, 
but  rather—because  the  redistribution  is  only  from  the  floating  charge—to 
encourage them to take different kinds of security. Indeed, once this adjustment 
has  been  made  by  sophisticated  creditors,  unsecured  creditors  may  well  be 
collectively worse off as a result of the redistributive scheme: on the one hand, 
they  will  receive  only  a  trivially  small  increase  in  their  expected  payout  on 
insolvency through the prescribed part (Mokal, 2001: 616-619; Association of 
Business Recovery Professionals, 2003: 11); on the other hand, if fragmented 
capital structures make it more difficult for banks to orchestrate workouts of 
financially distressed companies, this may increase the probability of default. 
Bearing in mind these costs, it seems difficult to justify the ‘prescribed part’ 
regime introduced by the Enterprise Act.   
 
This does, however, raise a related question. Might it be desirable to extend the 
policy behind the prescribed part so that it applies to all security, as opposed 
simply to floating charges? Such a measure would suffer from two practical 
problems.  First,  such  a  move  would  not  prevent  avoidance  activity  entirely. 
Rather, it would simply shift the locus away from the divide between fixed and 
floating charges, and towards the question whether a transaction was security or 
a ‘true sale’. Secondly, unless the funds ‘carved out’ are targeted specifically at   28 
non-adjusting creditors, such a measure gives adjusting unsecured creditors an 
opportunity to free-ride at secured creditors’ expense. 
 
E. Conclusions 
This paper has considered the scope, effects, and merits of redistribution from 
the floating charge in English corporate insolvency law. The statutory policy is 
effected through the preferential debts regime, the ‘prescribed part’, and (if, as 
seems  likely,  Buchler  v  Talbot  is  legislatively  overruled)  the  liquidation 
expenses regime. In relation to this policy, this paper has made three principal 
points.   
 
First, it has examined the way in which the history of the floating charge has 
been  closely  intertwined  with  that  of  statutory  redistribution  in  corporate 
insolvency. Against this context, it is clear that it was the statutory regime which 
provided the pressure for the constant litigation that has gradually hardened the 
juridical concept of the floating charge. The history of this litigation is that of 
sophisticated creditors seeking to adjust their affairs so as to fall outside the 
ambit of the statutory scheme. It appears that in so doing, they were remarkably 
successful, given the relatively low returns to preferential creditors. The House 
of Lords’ decision in Spectrum has closed one of the most significant routes by 
which banks were able to avoid the legislative scheme: the ‘fixed charge’ over 
book debts. In the wake of this ruling, it seems likely that companies will now 
find asset-based receivables finance to be more attractively priced than overdraft 
lending on the security of a floating charge over receivables.  
 
Secondly, it has been argued that the ex ante effect of the statutory scheme on 
corporate  finance  is  to  make  the  floating  charge  relatively  unattractive  as  a 
means  of  securing  lending.  The  effect  of  this,  which  we  may  expect  to  be 
intensified  by  Spectrum,  is  to  engender  increased  fragmentation  in  corporate 
borrowing.  For  an  asset-based  lender,  with  specialist  knowledge  about  a 
particular  asset  class,  a  floating  charge  is  unnecessary:  the  lender  has  the 
necessary expertise to be able to exercise control sufficient for a fixed charge (or 
outright sale). On the other hand a creditor following a relational approach to 
lending will gather specialist knowledge about the debtor’s business, as opposed 
to  particular  assets.  It  is  this  type  of  lender  (typically  a  bank)  for  whom  a 
floating charge may be the most useful means of taking security over circulating 
assets. If this cannot be done as cheaply as asset-based finance, because of the 
statutory ‘tax’ on floating charges, then small businesses will increasingly turn 
to invoice discounters and fragment further their borrowing. This may lead to 
difficulties  in  times  of  financial  distress,  when  a  single  concentrated  lender 
would be able to make the best-informed and most effective decisions regarding 
the firm’s future.    29 
Thirdly, it has been suggested that the costs created by the redistributive scheme 
(namely,  the  direct  costs  of  avoidance  action,  and  the  opportunity  costs  of 
induced  changes  in  corporate  finance)  are  not  counterbalanced  by  any 
significant  benefits  created  by  redistributive  payments  being  received  by  the 
relevant groups. The case for redistribution in favour of unsecured creditors on 
the grounds of their ‘non-adjustment’ is unpersuasive, and even if it is accepted, 
it  appears  the  position  of  unsecured  creditors  may  well  be  worsened  by  the 
redistributive scheme. Both the payment of liquidation expenses and the former 
payment of Crown preference out of floating charge assets gave the recipients 
incentives to engage in wasteful rent-seeking activity: that is, no social benefit at 
all resulted from these measures. Employees are the only current recipient group 
for  whom  redistribution  may  create  some  benefit.  However,  their  more 
successful cover by payments from the National Insurance Fund suggests that 
direct payments from the state can be used to achieve the benefits of providing 
employees  with  insurance,  without  the  distortive  effects  and  costs  of 
redistribution.  
 
In sum, the scheme of statutory redistribution in English corporate insolvency 
can  hardly  be  called  a  success.  This  paper’s  analysis  consequently  provides 
support for recent calls for the abolition of the distinction between fixed and 
floating security (Calnan, 2004)—and with it, the redistributive scheme. 
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48  Whilst  the  prescribed  part  is  taken  from  part  of  the  secured  creditor’s 
recoveries, as opposed to coming in advance of them (as the Crown preference 
formerly did), it is clearly anticipated that the impact on banks of the change 
will be neutral. The amount of the prescribed part will be adjusted, if necessary, 
to ensure this: see Insolvency Service (2005: 10-11). 
49 See Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1 para 14; Re Croftbell Ltd [1990] BCLC 844.  
50 Insolvency Act 1986 s 251. The fact that a lender is exercising control in order 
to protect its interests as such is not sufficient, without more, to constitute it as a 
shadow director (Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding [2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch) at 
[1267]); the question will depend on whether the cumulative pattern of conduct 
(ibid  at  [1609])  is  such  that  the  lender  has  become  the  ‘locus  of  effective 
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[corporate]  decision  making’:  Secretary  of  State  for  Trade  and  Industry  v 
Deverell [2001] Ch 340 at 354. 
51 The line is very fine indeed where the ‘sale’ is effected on a recourse basis: 
see Re George Inglefield Ltd [1933] Ch 1, 12, 22-23, 24-26, 27-28. 
52 On the use of this terminology, see the website of the Factors and Discounters 
Association: http://www.factors.org.uk/public/faq.asp.  
53 The line of least resistance for an overdraft lender wishing to convert their 
arrangement to ‘invoice discounting’ would be to use documentation providing 
for  a  global  assignment  of  receivables,  as  opposed  to  more  onerous 
individualised approval of receivables. This would, however, run a real risk of 
being characterized as a charge: see Motor Trade Finance Ltd v HE Motors Ltd 
(HL, unreported, discussed in Re George Inglefield [1933] Ch 1, 20-21); Re 
Kent  and  Sussex  Sawmills  Ltd  [1947]  1  Ch  177,  179-180;  Orion  Finance  v 
Crown Financial Management [1996] 2 BCLC 78, 84-85. 
54  Such  as  the  moratorium  on  the  enforcement  of  security  imposed  in 
administration proceedings: Insolvency Act 1986 Sch B1, para 43. 
55 Were the existing lender not granted priority, the new lender would be able to 
poach,  as  its  cushion  against  default,  part  of  the  ‘cushion’  of  assets  which 
protected the earlier lender against the risk of default. The competitive interest 
rate required for the second loan would therefore be commensurately lower. In 
effect,  the  firm  would  have  been  able  to  secure  finance  at  less  than  the 
competitive rate by expropriating the earlier creditor. 
56 The impact on debt capacity could be interpreted either as an interest rate 
reduction  from  the  secured  creditor,  or,  in  a  market  characterised  by  credit 
rationing owing to adverse selection problems (Stiglitz and  Weiss, 1981), an 
increase in the amount of credit offered.  
57 One of the reasons such arrangements are employed is to avoid difficulties 
that  might  be  encountered  with  negative  pledges  granted  to  banks,  were 
‘traditional’ security to be taken by asset financiers.  
58 Strictly speaking, of course, title retention involves a retention of outright 
ownership, rather than a grant of an interest by way of security: see, eg, Armour 
v Thyssen [1991] 2 AC 339, 352-354.  
59 The circumstances under which the moratorium in administration proceedings 
will not be lifted approximate to the situations in which such synergies exist. 
See, eg, Re Atlantic Computer Systems plc [1990] BCC 859, 880-882. 
60 This provides a rationalisation of the courts’ approach to the characterization 
of extended retention of title clauses, which, in England and Wales at least, have 
universally been held to create charges rather than outright beneficial ownership. 
   34 
 
In practical terms this limits the trade creditor’s priority to the original goods.  
61  Tort  victims  are  also  often  said  to  constitute  a  class  of  ‘non-adjusting’ 
creditor. However, their interests are well-protected in the UK through systems 
of mandatory insurance for the most empirically significant categories of tort 
claim, coupled with the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930, which 
transfers to the injured party an insolvent company’s claim against the insurer. 
Moreover, the author conducted interviews with approximately 20 Insolvency 
Practitioners during 1999-2000 (Armour and Frisby, 2001: 102), amongst other 
things asking subjects whether they had ever had to deal with significant tort 
liabilities  in  relation  to  a  case  they  had  conducted.  No  subject  was  able  to 
remember a single case where this had occurred.   
62 Mokal claims that the low level of recoveries for preferential creditors, which 
in turn imply even lower recoveries for the floating charge holder, is evidence of 
the floating charge’s lack of utility in protecting the interests of the secured 
creditor. In contrast, this paper’s argument is that this pattern of recoveries is 
rather evidence of banks’ success in structuring their lending so as to have as 
few  assets  as  possible  within  the  floating  charge  and  therefore  liable  to 
redistribution. Moreover, the pattern of recoveries can tell us little about the 
floating charge’s potential usefulness in protecting the chargee’s interests in a 
world where it is not subjected to such redistribution. 
63 Wheatley v Silkstone & Haigh  Moor  Coal Co (1885)  29 Ch D  715, 724; 
English and Scottish Mercantile Investment Co v Brunton [1892] 2 QB 700, 711. 
64 From the financier’s point of view, ‘quality’ here means the probability that 
payment will be made by the receivable debtor. 
65 This monitoring might occur in the context of an arrangement whereby the 
debtor  must  request  approval  of  finance  against  individual  receivables,  or 
batches of receivables. Alternatively, there might be a single general agreement 
to  fund  the  borrower’s  sale  ledger,  in  which  case  the  financier’s  specialist 
knowledge will have been used at the outset in scrutinising the quality of the 
borrower’s sales book, and will continue to be used in ongoing monitoring of the 
quality of the debts. 
66 To be sure, a basic floating charge would permit a debtor to use the charged 
assets ‘in the ordinary course of business’, words which have been interpreted to 
include  unusual  transactions  designed  to  save  the  business  from  failure  (see 
Ashborder  BV  v  Green  Gas  Power  Ltd  [2004]  EWHC  1517  (Ch);  [2005]  1 
BCLC 623 at [192]-[227]). However, additional restrictions—for example on 
sale or assignment of book debts—can of course be drafted into the security 
agreement, as can provisions for automatic crystallisation on specified conduct 
(see Fire Nymph Products Ltd v Heating Centre Pty Ltd (1992) 7 ACSR 365). 
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The most powerful control, however, comes from the lender’s threat—where the 
finance is coupled with an overdraft—to terminate, on demand, the company’s 
power to deal. 
67  This  combination  is  preferred  to  a  general  (‘entire  undertaking’)  floating 
charge  by  itself,  because  the  latter  would  not  offer  the  relationship  lender 
sufficient  protection  from  the  possibility  of  having  its  priority  subsequently 
downgraded by the subsequent grant of fixed charges over specific assets to 
other lenders. 
68 A second floating charge over the same assets will rank behind the earlier one: 
Re  Benjamin  Cope  &  Sons  Ltd  [1914]  1  Ch  800,  806-807;  Re  Automatic 
Bottlemakers Ltd [1926] Ch 412, 423. 
69 This is not to say that relationship lenders such as banks will not take floating 
charges. On the contrary, it is likely to continue to be worthwhile for them to 
take a ‘lightweight’ charge in order to be able to control the appointment of an 
administrator. Rather, the prediction is that they will not lend significant sums 
on  the  security  of  such  charges,  because  of  liability  to  fund  statutory 
redistribution. Their unwillingness to do so, coupled with their inability to take 
fixed  security  over  book  debts,  will  lead  to  companies  turning  to  invoice 
discounting instead.  
70 As between the two, it seems appropriate that asset-based financiers should 
take  priority  (as  they  generally  do):  in  focusing  their  attention  on  particular 
assets, it is more fundamental to their lending strategy than is general priority for 
relationship lenders: see Picker (1999). 
71 It is well-known that for larger firms, more heterogeneous capital structures 
are  associated  with  a  lower  probability  of  successful  workouts:  see,  eg, 
Chatterjee et al (1996). 
72 Insolvency Proceedings (Monetary Limits) Order 1986, SI 1986/1996, art 4. 
73 Part XII (ss 182-190). 
74 The amount is £280 per week, up to a maximum of 8 weeks: that is, £2240 per 
employee:  Employment  Rights  Act  1996  s  186(1)(a),  as  amended  by 
Employment Rights (Increase of Limits) Order 2004, SI 2004/2989, art 3. 
75 Ibid, s 189.  
76 A desire on the part of the judiciary to avoid this outcome under the previous 
version of the rules lead  to considerable complexity  in the law: see Re MC 
Bacon Ltd (No 2) [1991] Ch 127; Armour and Walters (2006). 
77  Insolvency  (Amendment)  (No  2)  Rules  2002,  SI  2002/2712,  modifying 
Insolvency Rules 1986 r 4.218(1)(a). 
78 [1970] Ch 465, 475-476. 
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